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I. INTRODUCTION
Studies of ethnoterritorial politics typically either examine political and
economic structures to emphasize the competing interests of groups, or use a
psychoanalytic approach to emphasize psychological and cultural forces.
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Researchers who do address both material and psychological factors often
attempt to weigh their relative importance as causes of conflict.1 We, in
contrast, propose that studies of ethnoterritorial conflict be modeled from the
perspective of social cubism, involving the interaction of material and
psychological mechanisms.2
The term 'social cubism' evokes images useful to describe our
perspective.3  Much like Rubic's Cube, ethnoterritorial politics poses a
multi-faced puzzle. People concentrating on only one aspect, or side of the
puzzle, are unlikely to produce a complete solution or picture of the problem.
Only when one considers the interrelations among the faces of the puzzle can
one progress toward a more holistic solution. A multidimensional perspective
was also advocated by the cubist artists, such as Bracque and Picasso, who
sought to render on two-dimensional canvass the multitude of perspectives
involved in viewing three dimensional objects. Similarly, we isolate key factors
to show how they combine to form complex patterns of ethnic politics.
We use the cube as an analytical framework to examine the Northern
Ireland and Qu6bec conflicts. In this comparison, we do not intend to cover the
whole terrain of each side of the cube but to highlight some of the most salient
issues of these complex conflicts. We rely heavily on other researchers'
conclusions concerning each facet. Our main contribution is in the combination
of the facets and the analysis of how their interaction affects the dynamics of
ethnoterritorial conflict and its regulation. While several researchers have
indicated that the nature of conflicts changes over time, relatively little work has
been done to examine the interaction of various factors in gradually shaping
conflicts.
We see the social cube of conflict as having six interrelated facets or
forces: history, religion, demographics, political institutions and non-
institutional behavior, economics, and psychocultural factors (see Figure 1).
These six facets or social forces combine to produce patterns of intergroup
behavior. For example, histories recounted by competing groups often evoke
1. See, e.g., Wayne G. Reilly, The Management of Political Violence in Quebec and Northern
Ireland: A Comparison, 6 TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE, 44-46 (Spring 1994). see also MARC
HOWARD Ross, THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT: INTERPRETATIONS AND INTERESTS IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (1993).
2. See SeAn Byrne & Neil Carter, Social Cubism: Six Social Forces of Ethnoterritorial Politics in
Northern Ireland and Quebec, 3(2) J. OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, at 52-72 (1996); Neal Carter & SeAn
Byrne, The Dynamics of Social Cubism: A View from Northern Ireland and Quebec, in RECONCILABLE
DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS IN ETHNOPOLrTICAL CONFLICTS, 41-46 (SeAn Byrne & Cynthia Irvin, eds.
2000).
3. This metaphor was suggested by Jessica Senehi during a conversation with the authors. See
Jessica Senehi, Language, Culture and Conflict: Storytelling As A Matter of Life and Death, 7(3) MIND AND
HUMAN INTERACTION 150-64 (2000); Carter, supra note 2 at 98-125.
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previous patterns of economic, political, or religious interaction to support
contemporary claims, while symbolism produces affective responses toward
groups and of intergroup interaction.4 As Connor notes, these factors are
typically studied as independent causes of conflict, failing to produce adequate
explanations.' Instead, ethnonationalism should be seen as a psychological
phenomenon emphasizing various intergroup differences to produce a sense of
group cohesion. The interaction among the sides of the cube produces patterns
of intergroup behavior.'
Northern Ireland and Qu6bec, rarely compared directly,7 indicate the
complexity of the relationship between psychological and material factors.
Several factors indicate, at least at first glance, that conflict should proceed in
similar patterns in both cases. Both regions have been members of the British
Empire in which Catholics were a significant part of the population whose
education and economic mobility was limited. In both Ireland and Qu6bec, the
theme of survival echoes in history. Nevertheless, Qu6bec has experienced
relatively minor violence, while terrorist activity has constrained the daily lives
of Northern Irish people. We propose that the interrelation of the six facets can
help explain differing levels of successful peaceful conflict regulation.
When describing the conflicts, we are forced to used labels that simplify
the complex interrelations of the facets. For example, the use of the categories
"Catholic" and "Protestant" in Northern Ireland and "Francophone" and
"Anglophone" are useful as general guidelines for membership. Unfortunately,
they also obscure a number of internal diversity. We would like to stress that
in using these categories we are not stating that language or religion is the cause
or the essence of the conflict. Instead, we are using categories that are used
prominently by the involved parties themselves. Let us now proceed to the
comparison of the six facets of ethnoterritorial conflict. The salient aspects of
each factor are summarized in Figure 3.
4. See generally JOHN AGNEW & STUART CORBRIDGE, MASTERING SPACE: HEGEMONY,
TERRITORY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1994); GIDON GOTTLIEB, NATION AGAINST STATE:
A NEW APPROACH TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND THE DECLINE OF SOVEREIGNTY (1993) (Council on Foreign
Relations, Washington, D.C.); MINORITIES AT RISK: A GLOBAL VIEW OF ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS (Ted
Robert Gurr, ed. 1993); TED ROBERT GURR & BARBARA HARFF, ETHNIC CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS
(1994); THE POLITICS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT REGULATION: CASE STUDIES OF PROTRACTED ETHNIC CONFLICTS
(John McGarry & Brendan O'Leary, eds 1993).
5. WALKER CONNOR, ETHNONATIONALISM: THE QUEST FOR UNDERSTANDING (1994).
6. Sehn Byrne & Loraleigh Keashly, Working with Ethno-Political Conflict: A Multi-Modal and
Multi-Level Approach to Conflict Intervention, 7(1) INT'L PEACEKEEPING 97-120 (2000).
7. See Byrne & Carter (1996), supra note 2; Carter & Byrne (2000), supra note 2; Reilly, supra
note 1. See also KATHERINE O'SULLIVAN, FIRST WORLD NATIONALISM: CLASS AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN
NORTHERN IRELAND AND QUEBEC (1986).
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Although we are forced to compare the six factors of the conflicts, we
attempt to show that these divisions are to some extent artificial. The crucial
point of our analysis it that social cubism focuses attention on the interplay
among factors. This notion allows us to advance beyond the primordialist and
instrumentalist notions of ethnic conflict by combining the notions of the
psychological importance of social groupings and the political utility of
emphasizing group divisions.8
II. HISTORIcAL FACTORS
History, recounted by those involved in conflicts, sets the context for
current ethnoterritorial politics. Stories of past events, seen from diverse
viewpoints, influence the legitimacy of current institutions, perceptions of
political possibilities and the attributed motivations of various groups.9 This
brief summary of Quebec and Northern Irish history highlights only some of the
historical events frequently evoked by the main parties involved.
Northern Ireland's troubles are often traced through a long history of ethnic
hostility. Norman forays from England into Ireland during the twelfth century
established a military presence to dominate the Gaelic chieftains.'° Feudalism
eliminated the communal practices and Brehon laws of the indigenous people.
Successive insurrections by the Irish nobility were squashed by English arms.
William of Orange's 1690 victory at the battle of the Boyne eliminated the
power of the Irish nobility and established an era of Protestant dominance."'
The 1692 Penal Laws secured a dominant relationship that allowed the
Protestant community to force most Catholics outside the socioeconomic and
political system. 2 Catholics could not be elected to political office, practice
their religion, speak the Gaelic language in public, or bequeath property unless
the heir converted to the Protestant faith. Cultural discrimination against
Catholics continued until Daniel O'Connell successfully mobilized the Irish
peasantry to agitate for political representation in parliament, and helped to win
8. See, e.g., Daniele Conversi, Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as
Boundary Maintenance and Creation, 1(1) NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS 73-85 (Spring 1995); Anthony
D. Smith, Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in the Reconstruction of Nations, 1 (1) NATIONS
AND NATIONALISM 1-34 (1995).
9. Senehi, supra note 3 at 150-64; Jessica Senehi, Constructive Storytelling in Inter-Communal
Conflicts: Building Community, Building Peace, in RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS IN
ENTHOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS 98-125 (Sehn Byrne & Cynthia Irvin eds., 2000).
10. PADRAIG O'MALLEY, THE UNCIVILL WARS: IRELAND TODAY (1983).
11. See generally SEAN BYRNE, GROWING UP IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY: THE INFLUENCE OF CONFLICT
ON BELFAST SCHOOL CHILDREN (1997).
12. J.J. LEE, IRELAND, 1912-1985: POLITICS AND SOCIETY (1985).
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emancipation in 1833 for the Catholic majority on the island of Ireland. 3
Charles Stuart Parnell's Home Rule movement of the late nineteenth century
divided the island between unionists in the northeast industrial heartland of
Ulster and nationalists in the agrarian South of Ireland. 14 Parnell's call of
"Home Rule for Ireland," was interpreted by Ulster Protestants as "Rome Rule"
because the religious cleavage became superimposed on the national question.
In 1912, Protestants of Ulster, fearing the prospect of a Catholic-dominated
Ireland, formed the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) to resist Home Rule. 5 A
deepening political polarization between both parts of the island was further
exacerbated by the Irish Volunteers' Easter Revolt of 1916, a failed insurrection
to break the British connection. 16 The 1919-21 War of Independence between
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British government produced the 1921
partition of Ireland, which altered but did not end the series of hostile relations
in Northern Ireland that intensified during the seventeenth century and still lock
the ethnic communities in sectarian strife.'7
Between the 1920 Government of Ireland Act and direct rule from London
in 1972 a self-governing Northern Ireland was dominated by the old Protestant
Unionist party.' S Attempts by the non-violent Northern Ireland Civil Rights
Association (NICRA) in the late 1960s to reform the region failed and spiraled
into chaos when NICRA was replaced by a militant IRA who confronted the
British army on the streets. 9 Since 1972, several attempts to formulate a
devolved constitutional framework for governing Northern Ireland have met
with little success.2" Terrorism propagated by Republicans and Loyalists
intensified polarization between communities, frustrating attempts of elite
13. McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 4; CYNTHIA IRVIN, MILITANT NATIONALISM: BETWEEN
MOVEMENT AND PARTY IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE BASQUE COUNTRY (1999).
14. HENRY PATTERSON, CLASS CONFLICT AND SECTARIANISM: THE PROTESTANT WORKING CLASS
AND THE BELFAST LABOR MOVEMENT 1868-1920 (1980).
15. PAUL DIXON, NORTHERN IRELAND: POWER, IDEOLOGY AND REALITY (2001).
16. TOM WILSON, ULSTER: CONFLICT AND CONSENT (1989).
17. ARTHUR AUGHEY, UNDER SIEGE: ULSTER UNIONISM ANDTHE ANGLO-IRISHAGREEMENT (1989);
NORMAN PORTER, RETHINKING UNIONISM: AN ALTERNATIVE VISION FOR NORTHERN IRELAND (1996).
18. See PAUL BEW ET AL., THE STATE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1921-72: POLITICAL FORCES AND
SOCIAL CLASSES (1979); PAUL BEW ET AL., NORTHERN IRELAND, 1921-1994: SOCIAL CLASSES AND POLITICAL
FORCES (1995).
19. PAUL AUTHOR, THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY, 1968-73 (1974).
20. See generally McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 4; PAUL BEW & HENRYPATTERSON, THEBRITISH
STATE AND THE ULSTER CRISIS: FROM WILSON TO THATCHER (1985); Paul Bew & Henry Patterson, The New
Stalemate: Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, in BEYOND THE RHETORIC: POLITICS, THE ECONOMY,
AND SOCIAL POLICY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 25 (Paul Teague, ed. 1987); PAUL BEW & HENRY PATTERSON,
SCENARIOS FOR PROGRESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1990).
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accommodation.2' Current negotiations between the British and Irish
governments and the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland, aimed at creating
a power-sharing devolved government and cross-border institutions, have
deescalated terrorist activity in the wake of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement
(GFA).22
Canadians recall a less violent past than the Northern Irish, but the
Francophones and Anglophones recount history differently. 23 Francophones
devote more study than Anglophones to the period before the 1867
confederation of Canada. Both linguistic groups celebrate heroes of their
linguistic group and emphasize the importance of cultural survival. The
Francophone Qubcois consider themselves a distinct nation continually
threatened with cultural extermination, while Anglophones struggle to maintain
a Canadian identity in the shadow of the United States.
After the British conquest of New France in 1763, British policy toward
the Francophones alternated between attempts to assimilate them into
Anglophone society and attempts to accommodate differences without
destabilizing their control. The 1837 Papineau Rebellion was premised on
demands for responsible government and the removal of the Chateau Clique, a
group of mostly Anglophone elites governing the colony.24 Lord Durham was
subsequently appointed Governor-General and asked to report on the situation.
He advocated a new system to assimilate the Francophones. This
recommendation produced the United Province of Canada, a legislative union
with two equally represented regions, one predominantly Francophone, one
mostly Anglophone.25
By the 1860s, Anglophones outnumbered Francophones within the United
Province of Canada. Anglophone reformers began to call for representation by
population. A combination of ethnic and ideological divisions produced
political deadlock. The 1867 Confederation of Canada joined New Brunswick
21. See ADRIAN GUELKE, THE AGE OF TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLrTCAL SYSTEM
(1995); Sedn Byrne, Conflict Regulation or Conflict Resolution: Third Part Intervention in the Northern
Ireland Conflict - Prospects for Peace, 7(2) TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1-25 (1995).
22. SeAn Byrne, Israel, Northern Ireland, and South Africa at a Crossroads: Understanding
Intergroup Conflict, Peace-Building, and Conflict Resolution, 28 INT'L J. OF GROUP TENSIONS 231 (1999);
SeAn Byrne, Power Politics as Usual in Cyprus & Northern Ireland: Divided Islands and the Roles of
External Ethno-Guarantors, 6(1) NATIONALISM AND ETHNIC POLITICS 1-24 (2000); Sedn Byrne,
Consocialtional and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland, 38(3) J. PEACE
RESEARCH 327-52 (2001).
23. See generally DAVID V.J. BELL, THE ROOTS OF DISUNITY: A STUDY OF CANADIAN POLITICAL
CULTURE (1992).
24. See LAURIER LAPTERRE, CANADA MY CANADA: WHAT HAPPENED? 86-99 (1992); J. ARTHUR
LOWER, CANADA: AN OUTLINE HISTORY 86-87 (1991).
25. LOWER, supra note 24, at 90-9 1.
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and Nova Scotia with Quebec and Ontario (the latter two having been carved
from the United Province of Canada), establishing the primarily Francophone
province of Qu6bec within a predominantly Anglophone country.26
French-Canadians established two approaches toward cultural survival.
Federalists argued that the best way to protect Francophone society was to
participate actively in Canadian federal affairs, ensuring that Francophones were
involved in political decision-making. This activist approach was attacked by
the Catholic Church and nationalists, who advocated cultural isolation.27 The
struggle between federalists and nationalists has continued to dominate
Francophone Qudbec's political landscape. Anglophone Quebecers, on the
other hand, have generally promoted a strong federal government. Several
events increased the tension between federalists and nationalists. The Radical
Liberal Party during the period of the United Colony of Canada advocated a
republican form of government removed from the Anglophone section, while
the Conservative Liberals favored cooperation with other Canadians. The Riel
Rebellion in the 1880s exacerbated tensions between Francophones and others,
reinforcing nationalist commitment to maintain a strong commitment to Quebec.
The loss of protection for Francophone rights in Manitoba weakened the
position of the federalists. When conscription was instituted to help with the
effort of both World Wars, Francophone nationalists argued that it was wrong
to send their people to fight "Britain's War" although many Francophones had
already volunteered. Recently, failed constitutional negotiations and referenda
on Qu6bec sovereignty have divided Quebecers.
During the 1960s, educational reforms and a decline in the Catholic
Church's political influence reduced schools' parochial nature. During the
so-called 'Quiet Revolution,' a new group of nationalists advocated the creation
of an economically competitive cadre of Francophones, birth rates plummeted,
and Quebec's legislature passed laws promoting the use of French. The goal
was no longer passive resistance for survivance. Instead, Quebicois demanded
the tools and opportunities necessary for ipanouissement (flourishing). Since
then, much debate has focused on the proper relationship between Quebec and
the 'Rest of Canada.' In the recent referendum debate, for example, nationalists
used the Lord Durham Report as evidence of the threat of assimilation, while
federalists cited the benefits of interethnic cooperation.
Several scholars highlight the massive changes in Quebec society brought
about by Pierre Elliott Trudeau during his tenure as Canadian Prime Minister
(1968-1979; 1980-1984)." McRoberts argues that the changes Trudeau
26. See generally P.B. WAiTE, THE CONFEDERATION DEBATES IN THE PROVINCE OF CANADA, 1865
(1963).
27. See generally LAURIER LAPIERRE, GENESIS OF A NATION (1966).
28. See, e.g., ROGER GIBBINS, CONFLICT AND UNITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO CANADIAN POLITICAL
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introduced in Canada, especially with respect to bilingualism, multiculturalism,
and constitutionalism have significantly reduced the potential for reconciliation
between Quebec and the rest of Canada.29 Trudeau's historical legacy remains
controversial today. More recent history, especially regarding linguistic politics
and the quest for constitutional recognition as a distinct society, will be
addressed in other sections.
As is clear from this cursory overview of the historical evolution of
ethnoterritorial politics in these two cases, ethnic groups emphasize different
factors as they interpret the past. These differences can increase hostility if their
histories provide sharply different interpretations and characterizations of other
groups.
Il. RELIGIOUS FACTORS
With the post-Cold War expansion of identity research, several researchers
have noted the need to increase our understanding of the psychological
dynamics of identity and transfer our knowledge to the realm of politics.
Brewer warns of the dangers of conceptual stretching of the concept of social
identity. 30 She distinguishes among person-based identity, role-based identity,
group-based identity and collective identity, and she calls for theorization that
recognized the implications of these different bases of identification and yet
could address the interactions among them.' Scholars need to understand more
fully the ways in which people manage multiple bases of identification. Huddy
argues that four key issues that hinder the successful application of
psychological research on social identity theory to political issues are 1) the
range of identity choices people can make, 2) the subjective meanings people
give to identities, 3) the differences in strength or potency identities have, and
4) the stability of several political and social identities. 32 These difficulties
require a great deal of nuance in discussing political identity conflicts, which is
why we advocate examination of the several facets of the social cube.
For example, social and political institutions are linked to religion, which
fosters bipolar societies in both Northern Ireland and Qu6bec. In Northern
Ireland, Protestants and Catholics attend separate schools and churches, rarely
intermarry, and live in separate neighborhoods for physical and psychological
LIFE (1994); LOWER, supra note 24.
29. See generally KENNETH MCROBERTS, MISCONCEIVING CANADA: THE STRUGGLE FOR NATION
UNITY (1997).
30. Mailynn B. Brewer, The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology
22(1) POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, at 115-125 (2001).
31. Id.
32. Leonie Huddy, From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity
Theory, 22(1) POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, at 127-156 (200 1).
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protection; religion preserves each group's way of life.33 In Canada, religious
affiliation promoted distinct life-styles, as economic differences and parochial
schools reinforced religious and linguistic polarization. We emphasize the
salience of conditional loyalty, discussed below, in promoting intergroup
tensions and polarization, bearing in mind the political salience of religion in
Qu6bec has declined drastically since 1960s while it remains a central concern
in Northern Ireland.
Catholics in Northern Ireland are relatively homogeneous in their religious
beliefs and their identification with the Irish nation.34 This cohesion withstands
enormous differences between the political agendas of the Social Democratic
and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (PIRA) about issues such as the legitimacy of violence
and the role of consent in disposing of Northern Ireland. For example, Grove
and Carter examine the rhetoric of John Hume and Gerry Adams to show
competing attempt to mobilize the nationalist/Catholic population in Northern
Ireland and to illustrate the interconnections between the context of the conflict
and the rhetoric used.36
Heterogeneity in the religious beliefs of Ulster Protestants does not directly
influence their national identity.37 Religious diversity does, however, create
some conflict between members of the different denominations and between
liberal or moderate and fundamentalist or extremist Protestants. 38  Intra-
Protestant conflict subsides when Protestants evoke a seventeenth century
religious covenant with the monarch to band together in a homogeneous bloc
to resist any perceived threat to their interests, especially Northern Ireland's
membership of the United Kingdom (UK).39
33. See generally JOHN WHYTE, INTERPRETING NORTHERN IRELAND (1990); NORTHERN IRELAND
AND THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION (Dermot Keogh & M.H. Haltzel eds. 1994).
34. See JOHN MCGARY & BRENDAN O'LEARY, EXPLAINING NORTHERN IRELAND: BROKEN IMAGES
(1995); EDWARD MOXON-BROWNE, NATION, CLASS AND CREED IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1983).
35. IAN MCALLISTER, THE NORTHERN IRELAND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND LABOR PARTY:
POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY (1977).
36. Andrea Grove and Neal Carter, Not All Blarney is Cast in Stone: International Cultural Conflict
in Northern Ireland, 20(4) POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 725-65.
37. See generally JOHN D. CASH, IDENTITY, IDEOLOGY AND CONFLICT: THE STRUCTURATION OF
POLITICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1996); RICHARD ROSE, GOVERNING WITHOUT CONSENSUS: AN IRISH
PERSPECTIVE (1971).
38. See generally FRANK WRIGHT, NORTHERN IRELAND: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1987).
39. See generally STEVE BRUCE, GOD SAVE ULSTER! THE RELIGION AND POLITICS OF PAISLEYISM
(1986); STEVE BRUCE, THE RED HAND: PROTESTANT PARAMILrrARIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1992); SeID
Byrne & Aimee Delman, Group Identity Formation and Intra-group Conflict, 25(4) THE J. OF INTERGROUP
RELATIONS 35-57.
20021
750 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:741
A key factor in intra-Protestant cooperation is conditional loyalty, an idea
similar to Scottish contractarian notion of covenanting: "If the ruler fails to live
up to his or her obligations, the subjects should not abandon the contract but
rather should refuse compliance with the laws and try to coerce the ruler into
keeping the bargain". 4° Conditional loyalty helps explain "how unionists
avoided the crisis of national identity which nationalists so often predict for
them"." Unionists are loyal to the monarch in her role as head of the
established church as well as head of the British state. Parliament, however,
lacks the religious legitimacy of the Queen. There is no contradiction in
Northern Irish Protestant opposition to the British Parliament since most
Protestants are ultimately loyal not to political institutions but to their
ethnoreligious identity.42 Protestants will remain loyal to Britain only as long
as Britain guarantees them a majority in Northern Ireland.43
Several historical examples illustrate the contractarian nature of Unionist
ideology-the Monarch's protection of the Protestant community's Ulster
identity and political attachments to the United Kingdom. For example, the
Home Rule crises of 1886, 1893, and 1912 saw an upsurge in riots in Belfast,
the creation of an Ulster Protestant army, and the development of the UVF in
which Protestants sought to resist Home Rule by force. In fact, World War I
narrowly averted a civil war in Ireland.44 Protestant opposition to direct rule
from London in 1972, the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, the 1993 Frameworks
Document, and the 1995 Framework for Peace further illustrates the depth of
Protestant fear and betrayal as well as the strategy of intra-Protestant
cooperation to protect their ethnoreligious identity and resist what they perceive
as a forced incorporation into a united Ireland.
Religion has played a different role in Canada. Religious loyalty prior to
the 1960s helped Canada maintain relatively peaceful interethnic group
relations. Colonial patterns in New France failed to produce strong
governmental institutions, leaving the Catholic Church as the most important
communal organization. In 1659, Monseigneur de Laval, bishop of Qu6bec,
established the tradition of ultramontism, the doctrine that the Church is
predominant in all social affairs and is politically superior to the state.45 After
40. DAVID MILLER, QUEEN'S REBELS: ULSTER LOYALISM IN HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE 5 (1978).
41. John Hunter, An Analysis of the Conflict in Northern Ireland, in POLITICAL COOPERATION IN
DIVIDED SOCIETIES: A SERIES OF PAPERS RELEVANT TO THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 25 (Desmond
Rea, ed. 1983). See also ROSE, supra note 37, at 40-88; WHYTE, supra note 33; BRUCE, supra note 39.
42. ARTHUR AUGHEY & DUNCAN MORROW, NORTHERN IRELAND POLITICS (1996).
43. See Moxon-Browne, supra note 34; ROY WALLIS ET AL., No SURRENDER: PAISLEYISM AND THE
POLITICS OF ETHNIC IDENTITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1-35 (1986).
44. McGarry & O'Leary, supra note 4.
45. See supra note 7, at 50.
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the British Conquest of Quebec, the 1774 Qu6bec Act recognized and supported
the dominance of the Catholic Church, which in return advocated acceptance of
British rule. Protestants (primarily Anglophones) were allowed to establish
separate social facilities. Parochial schools reinforced the power of the Church
and allowed each religious group to control the socialization of its own
members. The 1867 British North America Act (now called Constitution Act,
1867) reserved education policy for the provinces. Qu6bec maintains its
parochial school system, although reform is underway to change schoolboards
from being based on religion to being defined according to language.
Relations between religious groups in Qu6bec have not been as strained
historically as in Northern Ireland. Little economic or territorial competition
emerged between religious factions. After the Conquest, English Protestants
tended to cluster in specific regions, especially Montreal and the Eastern
Townships, and were relatively free to join the Canadian ethnic majority and
business elite.46 While the Catholic majority remained mostly in the primary
sector, Anglophone Protestants tended toward entrepreneurial ventures,
providing the capital for industrialization.
The history of ultramontism influenced the ethnonational identity of
French Canadians. As with Ulster Protestants, Canadian loyalty to religion was
stronger than that to parliament or the crown. Religious identity promoted
strong ties among members of a parish. The Church's decline as a powerful
social actor since the Quiet Revolution seems to have changed the focus of
group loyalty. Most social functions historically performed by the Church, such
as education, health, and welfare, now fall under provincial jurisdiction.47 As
the provider of these functions changes, so too does citizen identification with
social institutions. This change in loyalty is illustrated by a change in
self-identification: during the Quiet Revolution, French Canadians inhabiting
Qu6bec began to refer to themselves as Quibicois rather than Canadiens
fran~ais.48 The history of ultramontism, transferred to provincial loyalty,
increases the potential for rejecting the limited monarchy and the federation.
Furthermore, the legacy of the Catholic Church's emphasis on language
increased the salience of cultural differences, which currently dominate
constitutional debate in Canada.
Today, religion has more salience as a social category in Northern Ireland
than in Qu6bec. In Northern Ireland, religious difference tends to create a moral
46. See J. LEwis ROBINSON, CONCEPTS AND THEMES IN THE REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY OF CANADA
101-117 (Talonbooks revised ed. 1989); SHEILA MCLEOD ARNOPOULOS & DOMINIQUE CLIFf, THE ENGLISH
FACT IN QUEBEC (1980).
47. See LaPierre, supra note 24, at 178-95.
48. Louis Dupont and Dean Louder, Quelles Cultures Reproduire? (paper presented at the 1995
Conference of the Association for Canadian Studies in the United States, Nov. 15-19, 1995).
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rejection of compromise. In Qu6bec, religious differences historically helped
maintain relatively peaceful coexistence, since the Catholic Church advocated
acceptance of Canada in exchange for a level of cultural autonomy at the
provincial level. Ironically, the decline of religion's importance in Qu6bec may
increase the potential for intergroup conflict, as Qugbdcois identification
switched from the church to the province without reducing the importance of
linguistic differences.
IV. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
Demographic factors are crucial aspects of the two conflicts. In Quebec,
Francophones comprise about 85 percent of the population and dominate the
province's political system despite their minority status (about 20 percent of the
population) in Canada as a whole. The low birthrate of Qu6bec Francophones
increases demands for provincial involvement in social, language, and
immigration policy. In Northern Ireland, Catholics (primarily of Gaelic
descent) remain a minority, although their relative size is growing due to birth
rates that exceed those of Protestants. The decline of Protestants' relative
position increases fears of Catholic domination.
Demographic differences in Northern Ireland and Quebec lead to socio-
psychological patterns that can be seen as a conflict over national identity
between "double minorities".49 In Northern Ireland, Catholics and Protestants
see themselves as minorities, but are simultaneously viewed by the other
community as a threatening majority. 0 Double minorities reinforce the need for
security and recognition of each group's territorial claims. Northern Irish
Catholics see themselves as an Irish minority in Northern Ireland and a majority
in an all-Ireland context. Protestants are a majority of the population in
Northern Ireland, but a minority of the over-all population in the UK and in any
future united Ireland. Hence, Northern Ireland Protestants see themselves as a
besieged minority locked into an eternal struggle to defend themselves against
both internal and external forces.
In Northern Ireland, historical references to campaigns of genocide affect
the perceptions and fears each group holds of the "other."'" Protestants in
49. HAROLD JACKSON & ANNE MCHARDY, THE Two IRELANDS: THE PROBLEM OF THE DOUBLE
MINORITY (3d ed. 1984); WHYTE, supra note 33, at 100-02; John Whyte, How is the Boundary Maintained
Between Both Communities in Northern Ireland?, 9(2) ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES, at 219-34 (1986).
50. See Terrie Northrup, Dynamics of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict, in INTRACTABLE
CONFLICTS AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION 55-82 (Kriesberg et al., eds., 1989).
51. The Gaelic chieftains' 1641 massacre of Ulster Protestants and the seventeenth century
Cromwellian massacre of the Catholic inhabitants of Dundalk and Drogheda illustrate this point. See A.T.Q.
STEWART, THE NARROW GROUND: ASPECTS OF ULSTER 1609-1969 23-34 (1977); ROSE, supra note 37, at
180-204; MICHAEL FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE 2-98 (1980); MICHAEL MACDONALD,
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Northern Ireland have developed a pronounced "siege mentality." They
considered the Republic of Ireland as hostile to their interests and identity and
thus deem any move toward rapprochement with Catholics in Northern Ireland
as acceptance of eventual Irish unification.52 Catholics have been alienated by
their treatment within Northern Ireland and look to the government in the
Republic of Ireland to protect their interests. Each group, recalling a history of
community conflict, seeks a majority within political institutions in order to
prevent discrimination or suppression. The double minority in Northern Ireland
thus decreases the potential for the formation of a political "middle ground"
between the communities.
5 3
The double minority in Qu6bec, however, may actually mitigate conflict
due to Canadian federalism. The Anglophone minority in Qu6bec belongs to
the majority Anglophone community in Canada and North America. The
Francophone majority in Qu6bec also developed a "siege mentality," viewing
itself as a minority population engulfed in an Anglophone environment although
it sustains a provincial majority. Qu6bec nationalists traditionally advocated
high birth rates to attain the "revenge of the cradle" and maintain the
Francophone culture.
Qu6bec Francophones claim that legal limitation of the use of English in
education, businesses and advertisements is necessary to counteract the
overwhelming majority of Anglophones in Canada. Furthermore, Qu6b6cois
politicians have used education policies to increase the assimilation of
immigrants into the Francophone, rather than the Anglophone, community.
Anglophone Quebecers are a special minority within the province due partly to
the dominance of English throughout Canada and their well-established
presence in Qu6bec.
Many Anglophone Quebecers think of themselves as a political minority
in Qu6bec, strongly oppose Qu6b6cois nationalist policies, and fear that the
creation of an independent Qu6bec would cut their ties with the rest of Canada.
Others stress the importance of maintaining the special status of English in
Qu6bec, while also celebrating Qu6bec's cultural distinctiveness.
However, today immigration is affecting the relative status of both groups.
The changing demographic pattern, especially in Montreal, affects the relative
political strength of Anglophones and Francophones. As the Francophone
Quebecer population ages, with a low birth rate, the likelihood of Quebec
sovereignty winning a referendum appears to reduce as time goes by. This may
CHILDREN OF WRATH: POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1986).
52. See generally JOSEPH RUANE & JENNIFER TODD, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN
IRELAND: POWER, CONFLICT AND EMANCIPATION (1996).
53. See generally MERVYN T. LOVE, PEACE BUILDING THROUGH RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN
IRELAND (1995).
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well increase the feelings of Quebec Francophones as being a minority and
needing to increase control over cultural politics.
Clearly, this "double minority" has implications for the way these groups
in Northern Ireland and Qu6bec view the world.' In general, Northern Ireland
experiences more problems with terrorism and the salience of symbolism, and
conflicting national identities than Qu6bec because of the insecurity of each
ethnic group. The communities' lack of control over policies, mutual suspicion
of treachery, and use of terrorism and symbolism that promotes a siege
mentality all reduce the potential for Northern Ireland to create a sense of
"shared identity."55 In contrast, Qu6bec benefits from the existence of Canadian
federalism, which reduces both groups to minority status in some areas but
establishes them as a majority in others. This may promote some mutual
recognition. However, continued failure in the negotiation of constitutional
matters is reducing the good will on both sides of the debate. Despite the
potential for accommodation presented by the positive aspects of double
minorities (groups may extend special consideration to minorities within their
territory, if reciprocity can be expected), problems still threaten the equilibrium.
The relative size and rate of demographic change of the groups are significant.
The relative loss of population for Northern Irish Protestants can increase their
insecurities. In Qu6bec, declining birth rates and increased immigration are
forcing Qu6b6cois nationalists to redefine the basis for identification with their
group, and also shape their policies concerning the education of non-Christians
whose native language is neither French nor English.
V. POLrrICAL FACTORS
Peaceful regulation of ethnoterritorial conflict relies heavily on the political
legitimacy of the state, the inclusiveness of political institutions, and the
prevalence of non-institutionalized conflict such as terrorism. These functions
are interrelated, but various combinations are possible. In this section we
address the importance of boundaries and terrorism as political factors. These
factors greatly influence both the legitimacy of the state and the potential for
peaceful regulation of conflicts.
Many ethnoregional movements emphasize the territorial delineation of
political institutions in which they can participate. Qu6bec's provincial
boundaries allow the Quibecois some degree of control over a specific territory
within the larger Canadian context. Northern Ireland, however, has a boundary
that does not meet the demands of either Protestant or Catholic community.56
54. See WHYrE, supra note 33, at 25-43.
55. See generally BYRNE, supra note 11.
56. John McGarry, Political Settlements in Northern Ireland and South Africa, 46(5) POLITICAL
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Debate over the boundary in Northern Ireland increases group hostility as the
salience of national identity becomes a tangible threat to the existence of
Northern Ireland's position within the UK.57 When disputes over boundaries
and institutions devolve into terrorist action, the potential for peaceful
regulation is reduced, as the ability of the state to remain inclusive is challenged.
A. Boundaries
The political partition of Northern Ireland from the Irish Free State by the
1920 Government of Ireland Act did not resolve ethnic conflict. The foundation
of the border served only to foster sectarian politics. Moderate Nationalist
members of the SDLP and militant Republican members of Sinn Fein in the
Catholic community continue to agitate for a united Ireland. Moderate Unionist
members of the Official Unionist Party (OUP) and militant Loyalist members
of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) within the Protestant community seek
to maintain "peace through security,, 58 arguing that threats and terrorist attacks
by both the Continuity and Real IRA make special security arrangements
necessary.59
Protestants and Catholics maintain their entrenched positions concerning
the political status of Northern Ireland as part of the UK or a potential United
Ireland. According to international norms, Northern Ireland is not a full
member of the UK to the same degree as Scotland and Wales. 60 Northern
Ireland's constitutional limbo encouraged the political violence of the PIRA
while solidifying the siege mentality of Protestants. Moderate Unionists and
militant Loyalists are determined to protect the British link, thereby
safeguarding Protestant heritage and identity. Moderate Nationalists believe
that the root of the conflict is the British presence in Northern Ireland, and wish
to end partition by peaceful democratic means, contrary to the political violence
of the PIRA.6 ' Political competition over the geopolitical space of Northern
Ireland enhances feelings of fear, suspicions and uncertainty, thereby shaping
STUDIES 1-17; Brendan O'Leary, The Conservative Stewardship of Northern Ireland, 1979-97: Sound-
Bottomed Contradictions or Slow Learning, 45(3) POLITICAL STUDIES 663-76.
57. See generally KEVIN BOYLE & TOM HADDEN, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE CHOICE (1994).
58. See generally MICHAEL FARRELL, ARMINGTHE PROTESTANTS: THE FORMATION OFTHE ULSTER
SPECIAL CONSTABULARY ANDTHE ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY 1920-27(1983); EAMONN MCCANN, WAR
AND AN IRISH TOWN (1974).
59. Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland, 27(2) SECURITY
DIALOGUE 167-78.
60. See generally ADRIANGUELKE, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE( 1988).
61. See MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969-89
(1991); MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, BRmSH GOVERNMENT AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND QUESTION:
GOVERNING A DIVIDED COMMUNITY (1994).
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the political agenda for both communities. Nevertheless, all constitutional
parties in Northern Ireland, Nationalist and Unionist, accept the legality of
partition and agree that change will require the consent of the majority within
Northern Ireland.62
The border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland ensures
that Protestants and Catholics identify with a different political
entity-Northern Protestants with Britain and Northern Catholics with the
Republic of Ireland. Both communities live under the psychological stress of
a besieged minority depending on the conceptual lens is used to consider the
geopolitical context.63 This in turn allows each community to display fear and
suspicion of the political intentions of the "other side" as the political violence
of the paramilitaries prevents a solid middle ground from emerging. As Whyte
notes, the difficulty of regulating conflict in Northern Ireland stems from the
facts that "minorities are groups which feel threatened; that threatened groups
are liable to be hypersensitive; and that in Northern Ireland both groups display
these characteristics."'
Boundaries have a different significance in Canada. Qu6bec's provincial
boundaries enable the Qubcois to assert a great deal of control over their
cultural affairs. Conflict exists over the extent of power to be held at the
provincial and federal levels of government. These federal boundaries are less
prone to conflict than the more institutionally divisive border in Northern
Ireland. The ambiguous nature of federal boundaries increases the opportunity
for peaceful regulation of conflict.
As leaders debate Quebec sovereignty, however, boundaries gain
significance. The boundary between Qudbec and Newfoundland has never been
formally delineated. Outstanding aboriginal land claims and Anglophone
enclaves would obstruct the simple secession of Qu6bec. Furthermore, some
analysts argue that Qu6bec could only leave with its original boundaries and
would thus be forced to cede all land granted to it by the federal government.65
The past debate surrounding Canadian Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs
Stephane Dion's suggesting that parts of Qu6bec's population (especially
Anglophones and Aboriginals) could remain in Canada in the event of a
62. See generally DAVID BLOOMFIELD, PEACEMAKING STRATEGIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
BUILDING COMPLEMENTARITY IN CONFuCT MANAGEMENT THEORY (1996).
63. See Paul Dixon, Consocialtionalism and the Northern Ireland Peace Process: The Glass Half
Full or Half Empty, 3(3) NATIONALSIM & ETHNIC POLITICS 20-37 (1997); Paul Dixon, Paths to Peace in
Northern Ireland (I): Civil Society and Consociational Approaches, 4(2) DEMOCRATIZATION 1-26 (1997); Paul
Dixon, Paths to Peace in Northern Ireland (il): The Peace Processes 1973-74 and 1994-96, 4(3)
DEMOCRATIZATION 1-25 (1997).
64. WHYTE, supra note 33, at 100.
65. See, e.g., DAVID L. VARTY, WHO GETS UNGAVA? (1991).
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Qu6becois declaration of sovereignty' can be traced to a long-standing fear that
Anglophones might be separated from the rest of Canada.67 Once the boundary
is perceived as requiring a strict division of groups, the level of salience and
hostility of territorial disputes increases dramatically.
As a result of the 1995 attempt to declare independence, the Canadian
federal court ruled that Quebec did not have the right to such a declaration, but
that Canada would be obligated to negotiate should a clear majority of
Quebecers respond to a clear question about Quebec sovereignty. This simply
moved the debate to issues of what constitutes a clear majority and a clear
question. Turnover in the federal and provincial political arenas continues. The
Reform Party has been replaced by the Canadian Alliance with leader Stockwell
Day. With the resignation of Lucien Bouchard, Bernard Landry became
Premier of Quebec on 8 March 2001. The sovereignty issue is likely to remain
a subject of debate for some time.
B. Terrorism
Terrorism has been used in both regions to draw attention to conflicts.
Significantly, nationalist terrorism in Qu6bec was aimed primarily at symbols
of colonial or federal domination, whereas Republican violence in Northern
Ireland has targeted civilians in addition to property and symbols of the British
state. Sectarian attacks conducted by both Loyalists and Republicans produced
a state of fear and powerlessness marked by a self-perpetuating pattern of
deterrence and revenge.6"
In Northern Ireland, persistent paramilitary violence in the form of local
punishment beatings and shootings since the 1996 cease-fires indicates that the
future course of the fragile peace process could be marked by a return to
violence. A recent internal feud by the UVF and the UFF matched by
continued paramilitary activities by both the Continuity and Real IRAs suggest
that the current peace process should not be taken for granted.69 In the past,
paramilitary violence from the Republican PIRA to force the British
government out of Northern Ireland, and by the Loyalist UVF to keep Northern
Ireland British has claimed many lives, ensuring an enduring bicommunal
66. See Martin Lubin, Political Issues in Contemporary Quebec: Whither Party Politics in Quebec
since the Referendum? (paper presented at the 1996 Meeting of the New York State Political Science
Association Mar. 29-30, 1996); Anthony Wilson-Smith, Fighting Back, MACLEAN'S, Feb. 5, 1996, at 10-14.
67. See, e.g., George Koch, The Price of Separation, ALBERRTA REPORT, Mar. 17, 1990, at 13;
Ingrid Peritz, Anglo Separatists Surface Again, MONTREAL GAZETTE, April 20, 1991, at B4.
68. See WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 11-12; ALLEN FELDMAN, FORMATIONS OF VIOLENCE: THE
NARRATIVE OF THE BODY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND. (1991).
69. Byrne, supra note 21.
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conflict.7° For example, the Enniskillen Poppy Day massacre of eleven
Protestants in 1987 by the PIRA, the 1992 murders of Catholic and Protestant
patrons in a bar in Greysteel by the UVF, the 1993 PIRA murders of ten
Protestants in Frizzell's fish shop in West Belfast, and the 1998 continuity IRA
bombing of Protestant and Catholic civilians in Omagh, Co. Tyrone reinforced
historical fears of genocide in both communities. Loyalist paramilitary violence
has escalated during periods of crisis when British policy initiatives were
perceived as a threat to abandon Protestants to the Irish nation. Republican
violence, on the other hand, was aimed at forcing a British withdrawal thereby
creating a United Ireland.
Violence has polarized both communities in Northern Ireland, thereby
discrediting moderate alternatives. The PIRA has refused to surrender its arms
in exchange for Sinn Fein participation in the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Moderate Nationalists represented by the SDLP and moderate Unionists
represented by the OUP now fear, in the wake of the current arms
decommissioning impasse, that if concessions are not forthcoming by
Republicans and Loyalists, then advocates of physical force such as the
continuity and Real IRAs as well as the Red Hand Defenders and the Orange
Volunteers can claim to offer the only solution.7 '
The peak of terrorist activity in Qu6bec was in the 1960s, involving groups
like the Front de Libiration du Qubec (FLQ) who drew inspiration from
anti-colonial and civil rights movements, Marxism and the PIRA.72 In the early
1960s, the FLQ conducted a bombing campaign against symbols of colonial or
federal domination. The FLQ seems to have had about thirty active members,
most of whom were arrested in 1963. However, several apparently unconnected
groups identified themselves as FLQ cells. Bombing activities intensified in
1968-9, and in 1970 British Trade Commissioner James Cross and Qu6bec
Labor Minister Pierre Laporte were abducted. These abductions appear to have
been the acts of about ten people, but Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau
reacted forcefully, revoking protection of civil liberties, arresting 450 suspects,
destroying presses, and mobilizing 10,000 military and special police forces.73
Popular opinion, mildly in support of the FLQ, dropped dramatically when
70. See generally A CITIZEN'S INQUIRY: THE OPSAHL REPORT ON NORTHERN IRELAND (Andy
Pollak & Torkel Opsahl, eds. 1993).
71. Byrne, Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland,
supra note 2 1.
72. PIERRE VALLItRES, WHITE NIGGERS OF AMERICA: THE PRECOCIOUS AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A
QUEBEC "TERRORIST" (Joan Pinkham, trans., 1971).
73. See SHEILAGH HODGINS MILNER & HENRY MILNER, THE DECOLONIZATION OF QUEBEC: AN
ANALYSIS OF LEFT-WING NATIONALISM 195-223 (1973); JEAN-CLAUDE ROBERT, DU CANADA FRAN(AIS AU
QUIBECLIBRE: HISTOIRED 'UNMOUVEMENTINDtPENDANTISTE[FRENCH CANADA AND FREE QUEBEC:. HISTORY
OF THE INDEPENDENCE MOvEMENT] 283-86 (1975).
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Laporte was executed by his abductors. In Qu6bec, the governmental backlash
provoked by the attacks failed to produce the reaction desired by the terrorists:
instead of criticizing the federal government for invoking the War Measures
Act, citizens blamed the agitators for disrupting a peaceful, if unequal, system.
The failed attempts to amend the 1982 Constitution Act, enacted despite
the Qu6bec government's opposition, combined with the defeated referendum
on Qu6bec sovereignty may reduce the attractiveness of institutional politics for
Qu6bec nationalists. Some businesses who opposed sovereignty during the
referendum have allegedly received letters on FLQ letterhead threatening
retaliation for any further anti-sovereignty actions.74
Terrorism does remain a threat in Quebec. Recent bombings of caf6s with
Anglophone names have been linked to a renewed FLQ. Reaction against not
only the linguistic-cultural-political split in Canada but also against
globalization could prompt Quebec once more to enter into a period of struggle
with terrorism. This possibility will be reduced if institutional politics can
address the issues of concern to those who might turn to violence.
A difference between the two regions thus seems to be that the Qudbcois
have access to institutions which most view to be legitimate, while many
Northern Irish Catholics view political institutions as Protestant tools of
repression. Quebecers are thus able to protest specific issues without seeking
to destroy the entire political system. Institutional politics may further foster
less antagonistic views of the outgroup, while violence will increase the mutual
antagonism of groups. Canada's federalist structure permits more peaceful
conflict regulation.75 Northern Ireland's lack of a strategic middle ground
prevents cross-cutting cleavages, leading to institutional and constitutional
impasse. Political differences in Northern Ireland create tensions and
misperceptions between communities, resulting in a bipolar society.
VI. ECONOMIC FACTORS
Economic differences can be found in comparisons of virtually any groups.
They become important in ethnoterritorial conflict to the extent that disparities
can be linked to competition between groups, institutional favoritism,
stereotypes, or other factors that divide the groups. Leaders of ethnoterritorial
movements may exploit disparities in the distribution of economic resources to
mobilize a particular constituency to support for their demands. Awareness of
intergroup discrimination adds economic concerns to the overall categorization
of the Other.
74. Diane Francis, Threatening Letters and an FLQ Logo, MACLEANS'S, April 22, 1996, at 11.
75. See generally MICHAEL BEHEILS, THE MEECH LAKE PRIMER: CONFLICTING VIEWS OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCORD (1989); MCROBERTS, supra note 29; PATRICK J. MONAHAN, MEECH LAKE: THE
INSIDE STORY (1991).
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Northern Ireland's Protestants have historically had greater access to
political and economic resources than Catholics.76 Catholic areas have higher
unemployment rates than Protestant areas. Recruitment practices, lack of
industrial development, emigration and discrimination increase the economic
gap between Protestants and Catholics, divide the working classes, and reinforce
intergroup discrimination.77 Economic privileges in housing and employment
enjoyed by Protestants reduced the salience of class conflict and may in part
explain continued Protestant support for institutional links with Britain.78
Although both groups have similar distributions of members identifying with
various economic classes, they are likely to see intergroup differences as more
important than intragroup disparity.79
Qu6bec long exhibited economic patterns similar to Northern Ireland.
Protestantism correlated strongly with capitalism; Qu6bec was dominated
economically by the Anglophone minority, as Francophone Catholics tended to
shun capitalist ventures. By the 1960s, studies of economic disparity showed
vast differences in the economic welfare of Qu6bec's two linguistic
communities."0 This inequality helped change nationalist sentiment in Qu6bec
from ultramontane isolationism to secular cosmopolitanism as the Quibecois
began to seek political control of provincial resources. The federal and Qudbec
governments initiated language laws to address new perceptions of economic
discrimination against Francophones. Nevertheless, the two languages remain
asymmetrical, and it is generally more advantageous for Francophones to learn
English than for Anglophones to learn French. Qu6bec politicians defend their
relatively strict language laws on the need to counteract this asymmetry. Since
76. See John Agnew, Beyond Reason: Spatial and Temporal Sources of Ethnic Conflicts, in
INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION 44-46 (Louis Kriesberg et al., eds., 1989); FARRELL,
supra note 5 1, at 2-98; WALLIS ET AL., supra note 43, at 1-35; LIAM O'DOWD ET AL., NORTHERN IRELAND:
BETWEEN CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL WARS (1980); John Agnew & James G. MacLaughlin, Hegemony and the
Regional Question: The Political Geography of Regional Industrial Policy in Northern Ireland, 76 ANNALS
OF THE ASSOC. OF AMER. GEOGRAPHERS, 247-61 (1986).
77. See PAUL ARTHUR & KEITH JEFFREY, NORTHERN IRELAND SINCE 1968 (1988); R.J. CORMACK
& ROBERT D. OSBORNE, RELIGION, EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT: ASPECTS OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN
NORTHERN IRELAND (1983); Bill Rolston, Alienation or Political Awareness? The Battle for the Hearts and
Minds of Northern Nationalists, in BEYOND THE RHETORIC: POLITICS, THE ECONOMY, AND SOCIAL POLICY
IN NORTHERN IRELAND 58-91 (Paul Teague, ed. 1987).
78. See FRANK GAFFIKIN & MARTIN MORRISSEY, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE THATCHER YEARS
(1990); RONNIE MUNCK, IRELAND: NATION, STATE AND CLASS STRUGGLE (1985); BELINDA PROBERT,
BEYOND ORANGE AND GREEN: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND CRISIS (1978).
79. Sedn Byrne & Michael Ayulo, External Economic Aid in Ethno-Political Conflict: A View from
Northern Ireland, 29(4) SECURITY DIALOGUE 219-33 (1998).
80. See, e.g., JOHN PORTER, THE VERTICAL MOSAIC: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CLASS AND POWER
IN CANADA (1965); Jacques Mathieu and Jacques Lacoursi~re, LES MtMOIRES QUtBPCOISES [THE MEMOIRS
OF THOSE FROM QUEBEC] (1991).
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the Quiet Revolution, Francophone Quebecers have greatly improved their
economic status and education levels.
Both Northern Ireland and Quebec have exhibited patterns of nepotism that
increase within-group solidarity. If this pattern is accepted by the groups, as in
traditional Quebec, it will not be harmful to intergroup accommodation.
However, if economic competition dominates or a shift occurs in economic
trends, polarization and hostility may very well increase.
VII. PSYCHOCULTURAL FACTORS
Tensions and emotions have often escalated during social change or
perceived political crises between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland
and between Anglophones and Francophones in Qudbec. During crises, each
group portrays the opposing culture as an outgroup or enemy to rally the
ingroup against potential genocide or subjugation. Cultural symbols and
stereotypes reinforce group identity and solidarity and clearly distinguish the
ingroup from the outgroup.
The importance of symbolism helps explain the nature of the conflicts in
Northern Ireland and Quebec. Symbols create a sense of commonality among
group members and help them categorize their political beliefs. Ethnoterritorial
groups often promote prejudice and stereotyping by invoking group traditions
to symbolize issues (e.g. nationality, religion, and ethnic identity) that have yet
to be resolved."' The Northern Irish conflict appears intractable because
economic issues are complicated by religious and national identity crises
embedded in people's minds from an early age. 2 These psychocultural and
political images are used to categorize people from the other community as an
outgroup.83 Quebec's role in Canada's constitutional debate centers around
Quebec's status as a distinct society or as one of ten equal provinces.' The
nature of debate and form of conflict management in these two regions create
unique political cultures.
81. See, e.g., KEVIN BOYLE & TOM HADDEN, NORTHERN IRELAND: A POSMVE PROPOSAL (1985);
E.E. O'DONNELL, NORTHERN IRISH STEREOTYPES (1978).
82. See ROSE, supra note 37, at 60-127.
83. See, e.g., John E. Greer, Viewing the Other Side in Northern Ireland: Openness and Attitudes
to Religion among Catholic and Protestant Adolescents, 24 J. FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 275-92
(1985); ROSEMARY HARRIS, PREJUDICE AND TOLERANCE IN ULSTER: A STUDY OF NEIGHBOURS AND
STRANGERS IN A BORDER COMMUNITY 178 (1972).
84. See, e.g., RONALD L WATTS & DOUGLAS M. BROWN, OPTIONS FOR A NEW CANADA (1991);
CHARLES TAYLOR, RECONCILING THE SOLITUDES: ESSAYS ON CANADIAN FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM
(1993); MONAHAN, supra note 75.
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In Northern Ireland, myths of siege, victory, massacre and martyrdom
permit two distinct cultural traditions to co-exist uneasily in a sectarian milieu.85
Protestants and Catholics use these historical events to promote group solidarity,
thereby reducing the potential for intergroup cooperation. 86 Northern Irish
Protestants believe that their cultural symbols, flags, and holidays are of
importance to their core values, cultural mores and belief structures. Orange
marches are perceived as a "traditional expression of a legal right" to display
Protestant values and symbols.8 7 Likewise, Northern Irish Catholics wear Easter
lillies to commemorate the Easter Rising of 1916. The existence of these
cultural and religious symbols reinforces ingroup solidarity and outgroup
hostility.8"
A strong link exists between Republican violence, Catholicism, and a
pan-Celtic culture centered around the redemptive nature of a blood sacrifice.
Northern Irish Catholics often invoke the symbolic significance of "martyrs for
the cause," or Christ-like figures, best exemplified by the deaths of Bobby
Sands during the 1981 Hunger Strikes and Patrick Pearse during the 1916
Rising.89
Symbolic rituals tend to further escalate the conflict by fostering the
growth of sectarian belief structures. Extremists depict the conflict as a struggle
between good and evil.' Moderates, however, perceive the conflict in political
and economic, rather than religious, terms.9' As debate turns from economic
and political matters to questions of ethnoreligious identity, polarization
removes the middle ground.92
Lipset claims that Canada is a country of defeated nations, and therefore
its symbolism often reinforces notions of the challenge of survival for distinct
societies in an inhospitable climate, faced with the ever-present threat of
assimilation. 93 Quebec also has some heroes that exemplify the hardships of
Francophone survival. Louis Riel, a Mdtis leader in the West, exemplified the
85. STEWART, supra note 5 1.
86. See MARl FrrTDUFF, BEYOND VIOLENCE: CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESSES IN NORTHERN
IRELAND (1996).
87. WALLIS ET AL., supra note 43, at 1-20.
88. Byme & Delman, supra note 39; NORTHRUP, supra note 50.
89. See Conor Cruise O'Brien, Ireland: The Mirage of Peace, 33 THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 23-33
(Apr. 1986); JOHN M. FEEHAN, BOBBY SANDS AND THE TRAGEDY OF NORTHERN IRELAND (1986).
90. See Jennifer Todd, Two Traditions in Unionist Political Culture, 2 IRISH POLITICAL STUD. 1
(1987). See also WHYTE, supra note 33.
91. See Cathal McCall, Postmodern Europe and the Resources of Communal Identities in Northern
Ireland, 33 EURO. J. OF POLIT. RESEARCH 389 (1998).
92. AGNEW, supra note 76, at 41-53.
93. See generally Seymor Martin Upset, CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: THE VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1990).
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difficulties faced by Francophones outside Qu6bec. Riel was hanged as a traitor
for leading a revolt against the revocation of protection for Francophone Mdtis
in Manitoba. Nationalists use his story to exemplify how hostile the rest of
Canada is to Francophone equality. Qu6bec politicians use symbolism
effectively, emphasizing land, language, faith and families. The feast of St.
John the Baptist is held as Quebec's national holiday. To intensify the sense of
Qugbicois nationalism, activists have used slogans such as "Maitres chez-nous"
(Masters in our own house) to represent a desire for self-determination and
economic responsibility. With the increased Francophone attention to national
symbolism, Anglophones responded with Canadian symbols: the Maple Leaf
has been the insignia of Canada only since 1965; "0 Canada" replaced "God
Save the Queen" in 1967.
During the 1995 referendum on sovereignty, both the yes and the no sides
attempted to use symbols to depict their allegiances. While the nationalists
tended to give priority to Qu~bdcois symbols, they chose to use the Canadian
dollar coin in their symbolism, to represent continued economic cooperation
between an independent Quebec and the rest of Canada. Federalists frequently
merged Canadian and Quibicois symbols in an attempt to illustrate the
coexistence and complimentarity of loyalties to both entities.
Symbolism intensifies violence in Northern Ireland, where people can be
terrorized for belonging to one group or another; but it has not led to violent
conflict in Qu6bec. The Northern Irish conflict is marked by intense hostility
and imagery that rejects cooperation with the other community. In Canada,
however, the myth of "two founding races" forging a social compact indicates
the desirability of intercommunity accommodation despite fundamental
differences.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In general, Northern Ireland experiences more problems with terrorism and
conflicting national identities than Quebec due to each ethnic group's insecurity
over the national question. Lack of control over policies, mutual suspicion of
treachery, histories of intercommunity violence, and symbolism that promotes
a siege mentality all reduce the potential for Northern Ireland to create a sense
of shared identity. In contrast, Qu6bec benefits from the existence of
federalism, which reduces both groups to minority status and also promotes
some mutual recognition based on the myth of Canada's creation through a pact
between the two "founding races." However, repeated failure in the negotiation
of constitutional matters is reducing the good will on both sides of the debate.
Despite the potential for accommodation presented by the positive aspects of
double minorities, problems still threaten the equilibrium.
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We have identified a number of significant interrelated factors that are part
of a multi-causal analysis of conflict in Northern Ireland and Qu6bec. These
six facets or social forces of the cube must be examined together if we are to
understand how ethnoterritorial conflicts can be ameliorated or exacerbated.
The six factors produce different patterns, with some factors reinforcing
potential conflict and others mitigating the differences. Unfortunately, the
social cube cannot capture the dynamic nature of politics, and therefore may
seem to give too little weight to recent events in both regions. However, our
analysis indicates the difficulties that must be overcome if a lasting settlement
is to be reached in Northern Ireland as well as those that face Quebecers
attempting to define the political nature of their province. The interlocking
nature of the cube also indicates that addressing only one dimension is unlikely
to provide a settlement, but also that improvements in a single area may
ameliorate others as well.
What stands out in our analysis is the way that material and psychological
dimensions interact to maintain or mitigate intergroup conflict. Entrenched
sectarian attitudes result from political and economic institutions and cultural
stereotypes that reinforce bigotry, suspicion and polarization. A holistic, social
cubism approach to intergroup conflict must account for how structural and
psychocultural mechanisms interact to exacerbate or, indeed, ameliorate
ethnoterritorial conflicts. Future research should address the interrelation of
material and psychological mechanisms that shape ethnoterritorial politics.
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C. Figure 3: Six Social Forces of the Complex Cube
CONFLICT FACTOR NORTHERN IRELAND QUtBEC
ECONOMIC Both groups support nepotism. Anglophones traditionally
Working class divided along dominated the economy.
ethnic lines. Class differences Modernization since 1960s
exist within groups, but are increased Francophone stake in
perceived as less important than business.
inter-group differences.
RELIGIOUS Both groups tend to form Religion was basis for separate
enclaves. Protestant loyalists educational systems. Catholic
follow the doctrine of church was the dominant social
conditional loyalty, institution, but religiosity has
declined since the 1960s.
POLITICAL Terrorism used to address Federal structure allows groups
partition and instill fear within means of effective, legitimate
and between communities to representation. Nationalism
maintain bipolar society. concentrates on role of Quebec
Partition is central to national as defender of the Francophone
identity. Direct rule from UK culture.
instituted in 1972 due to lack of
Catholic representation.
PSYCHO-CULTURAL Traditions, values, holidays and Francophones traditionally used
symbols reinforce ethnic and language, land, race, and
religious identity; the conflict is religion to promote their
emphasized in symbolic identity. In the 1960s,
marches. Gaelic schools have Francophones increasingly used
been active in Catholic nationalist symbolism.
nationalist working class areas, English-Candians responded
thereby reinforcing ethnic with the development of
identity and fear. Cultural Canadian symbolism. Some
events maintain communal blending of Canadian and
divides, thereby hindering Quebec symbols by the
shared identity. federalists.
HISTORICAL Martyrdom and battles are French-English conflict is seen
used to reinforce intergroup as constitutive of Canada.
conflict and promote enclaving. Qudbdcois often refer to the
Reenactments of historical "Conquest" and refer to
events emphasize the salience of Anglophones as "English."
territory and ethnic cohesion. English Canadians tend to use
regional categories.
DEMOGRAPHIC Fear of genocide helps Anglophones are part of the
emphasize ethnoterritorial wider Canadian context.
identity. "Double Minorities" Francophones have developed a
affect perceptions each group siege mentality to sustain a
holds of the other. Positions are regional and linguistic identity.
defended and a small Changes in birthrates and
middle-ground is not in a immigration affect Qu6bec's
position to articulate and cultural policies.
accommodate interests.
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D. Figure 4: Interacci6n de las Seis Fuerzas
CONFLICT FACTOR NORTHERN IRELAND QUIBEC
ECONOMIC Used to support claims of Primarily used to compare Quebec and
discrimination based on other provinces. Has occasionally been
religion. Could potentially used to compare linguistic groups,
mitigate ethnic cleavage especially during the Quiet Revolution.
with internal class
divisions
RELIGIOUS Used as a primary Has lost some salience with
category label, replacing modernization, but helped shape a
ethnicity and language. tradition of acceptance of hierarchy and
Decreases potential for compromise between two main
compromise, as moral linguistic groups, and divergent
symbols are lent to economic patterns. Its salience is now
conflicting parties. less than that of ethnicity and language.
POLITICAL Terrorism reinforces Terrorism was a minor issue, but
religious cleavage, reduces deliberate killing for political ends
salience of economic deemed unacceptable. Current political
factors, and contributes to institutions, through their complexity,
historical backing for reduce the salience of cleavages.
continued conflict. Political institutions have a mixed
Reduction of violence may effect on histories, as nationalists and
mitigate conflict, federalist can selectively choose
Constitutional status examples.
unacceptable to most
citizens.
PSYCHO-CULTURAL Generally these factors These factors have a mixed effect in
reinforce a bipolar conflict Quebec. Some promote overlapping
by emphasizing the threat loyalties with Qudbec and Canada,
of mutual destruction. while others indicate loyalty is
May change with the mutually exclusive. English Canadian
cease-fire and confidence symbols are largely a reaction to
building measures. Francophone nationalism, and were
slow to distance themselves from
British symbols.
HISTORICAL Histories used to promote Histories mixed between conflict and
a bicommunal view of the compromise. Figures of cooperation
region through the may also be seen as figures of co-
recounting of past conflict optation.
DEMOGRAPHIC Narrowing population gap Decline in Qurbecois birthrates
increases Protestant fears increases Francophone fears of
of assimilation. Proximity assimilation and demand for increased
increases need to maintain control of cultural policies.
boundaries. Francophone dominance in the
_ province mitigates the level of hostility.
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E. Figure 5: Early Warning-Contingency "Social Cube" Escalators!
De-escalators
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